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The paperostensibly refers to Harold Bloom’s categories 
of the anxiety of influence. Bloom’s theory is treated 
as an immanentist one, i.e. text/aesthetics/personality 
-oriented, which is specific to the period in which 
the theorywas developed. However, at least from the 80s 
of the XXth century, there occurs a visible change towards 
sociologization of all the human sciences. The paper appropriates 
and resignificates Bloom’s categories and intermingles them 
with the concepts of social psychology in order to enable 
a description of the condition of writers in the current 
social context.
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Does The Anxiety of Influence have any influence on thinking about litera- 
ture 40 years after its publication?1 Harold Bloom’s claims are universal, 
therefore he would answer “yes” to that question; that is, “yes, if there 
are strong poets”. The discussion between universalists and contextualists 
(to provide a heuristic and handy label) is a paradigmatic and paradog-
matic misapprehension, probably always inconclusive. After all, what 
conclusion can there be, if I say that the definition of “strong poets” 
is arbitrary and historical, and the effect of the so-called “universalism” 
is, as usual, a rhetorical effect on the part of a strong critic, while 
the cultural conditions – I might also say, the literary field – have changed 
and those claims do not apply to the contemporary situation in literature? 
Such a claim would imply, certainly, that Bloom’s theory has never been 
universal; to which the universalist would reply that the theory has been 
universal: it is just the times that are weak and there are no more strong 
poets.2 Yet this is the kind of discussion I want to draw Bloom into. 
However, I need to emphasize that, despite the text being split into two 
large parts, the first one being a commentary on Bloom, the second 
one my own methodological contribution, I do not see this essay 
as a commentary on Bloom. The things I have to say about his theory 
are not too innovative and I am aware of that; I rather recapitulate some 
of the discourse on Bloom, yet treat this part as heuristic. My main aim 
is to offer the tropology of the anxieties of social influence, which is done 
in the second part. Overwhelmed neither by the grandeur nor the beauty 
of Bloom’s theory, I nevertheless see his chart of tropes as useful to extend 
or open to social contexts. Bloom for me is primarily a literary critic 
or theoretician, not a philosopher or anthropologist, or a religious 
thinker, as some read him (and justly). I am using Bloom and his chart 
of tropes (perhaps reducing his theory to the latter) not to diminish 
the philosophical importance of his thought, but simply because I want 
to elaborate on a handy set of social situations that writers face, having 
felt the need of such a scheme during my interpretative work on queer 
1  The research was subsidized by the Polish National Center for Sciences grant 
nr DEC-2012/04/S/HS2/00561.
2  See e.g.: “yet it seems just to assume that poetry in our tradition, when it dies, 
will be self-slain, murdered by its own past strength” (Bloom 1997, 10). Bloom would 
rather say, then, that the golden age has become bronze. However, he uses the phrase 
“in our tradition”. It is contradictory to speak of “universalism” and “our tradition” 
at once, but here is the conservative solution: instead of assuming that the “tradition” 
(or “paradigma”, or “field”, because this is what Bloom means, not simply “the past”) 
might change, it is suggested that the times might change, but not the tradition; 
that its appeal – its challenge – stays always the same, and/or that it should. 
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literature, and preferring to use a settled and recognizable terminology 
instead of inventing my own neologisms. 
Bloom’s aim, as revealed in the prologue, is to bring literary criticism 
onto the right track, which he calls the study of “intra-poetic relation-
ships” (Bloom 1997, 5), and three pages later more specifically the study 
of “intra-poetic relationships as parallels of family romance” (Bloom 
1997, 8). I will stick to this image in a moment. If we were to locate 
Bloom’s project on the map of literary criticism’s historical tendencies, 
we should say that it represents the high modernist ideal of ergocentric 
criticism, proving the highly autonomous (at that time) stage of the literary 
(artistic) field. Bloom’s move in this subfield was, firstly, to focus this 
ergocentric interest not only on the object, that is, the literary text, 
but also on its producer, or more precisely, on the object as it reveals 
the producer in a double operation – reading the object through the producer 
and the producer through the object; and secondly, but still in ergo-
centric mode, to duplicate the producers and their objects respectively, 
asserting a metonymical relationship between them. This metonymy 
is necessary to remain in the ergocentric paradigma. A metaphorical 
relation between two poets could involve, e.g. history of genres, history 
of literary processes, and, most horribly for Bloom, social contexts (and it 
was not a novelty in Bloom’s times, of course; this metaphorical relation 
is usually the basic figure of thought in many and varied comparative 
literature studies), and this is what he, at least in theory, tries to avoid. 
Let’s take the Freudian image of the “family romance”. I don’t think 
it would be going too far to assume that Freud, and Bloom respectively, 
connect the image of the “family” with the image of “home”. Bloom’s 
vision of ergocentric criticism, then, would mean staying in a closed 
and homely space, in the inside, as opposed to being “outside”, among 
people accidentally encountered on the streets, within the institution 
of houses etc. I take it as an invitation to use Freud’s category of Heimliche 
and Unheimliche, homely and unhomely (and “uncanny”).3 If, allegoric- 
3  Mark Edmundson says Bloom’s Anxiety depicts a gothic story of “spectral 
posession” of the ephebe (Edmundson 1999, 164). Bloom’s theory is gothic 
if – nowadays a commonplace in gothic studies – Freud is a gothic writer (and 
Edmundson shares this view), for Bloom is utterly Freudian. The spectre of a dead 
poet certainly is uncanny and to some extent “unhomely”. But in my “gothic fable” 
the difference between “homely” as “literature-influenced” and “unhomely” as the “social” 
is this: the spectre of a dead poet does not come through the window, it comes 
from the books which are in the house, while the “social” comes from the outside 
and haunts differently. I should say, then, that the spectral possession by a dead 
writer is not so much “unhomely” as “uncanny” –  it is the ghost in the attic; while 
the “social” is “unhomely” and probably “uncanny”.   
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ally speaking, the ergocentric study of literature is homely, is something 
that happens at home with all its dark family secrets, then the main 
anxiety is about the intrusion of the unhomely, of the outside, of socio-
logical, political, economic etc. contexts, that once were thrown out 
through the door, but came back through the window. This is what I take 
to be Bloom’s anxiety: the anxiety of social intrusion, or less dramatically, 
influence, the great comeback of the repressed. And Bloom is only one 
example of those olden-days-ergocentrics (and “universalists”) who are 
now so horrified by the sociological turn(s) in literary criticism. As I see 
it, the contemporary sociologization of the humanities, or – in Gianni 
Vattimo’s expressions – “the sociological impressionism of philosophy 
or sociologizing approach to philosophy or the slide of philosophy into 
sociology” (Vattimo 2003, 4, 5, 8),4 which is a paradigmatic change that 
started somewhere in the 80s, is this great comeback of the repressed. 
Alain Finkielkraut also diagnoses and laments such a sociological slide, 
albeit, contrary to Vattimo, with explicit concern and criticism. In his 
Nous autres, modernes, e.g. in the chapter La post-culture, he quotes both 
Mallarmé and Jakobson. The former represents the ideal of pure poetry, 
or, translated into a different language, the stage of high autonomy 
of the literary field (in fact, Bourdieu quotes Mallarmé as an example; 
while in turn, Finkielkraut quotes Bourdieu critically) (Bourdieu 1995, 
276–277). The latter with his definition of the poetic function of language 
represents golden-era criticism as opposed to sociologized cultural studies 
(Finkielkraut 2005, 165–176). But “cultural studies” is not the only 
field of sociologized humanities, and Finkielkraut is not the only one 
in the humanities to lament it. Bloom’s new preface to the second edition 
of The Anxiety of Influence speaks against cultural studies and the “current 
School of Resentment” as an attempt to eradicate the uniqueness of art 
(exemplified by Shakespeare).5 But Bloom’s argument is weak and relies 
mostly on a rhetorical trick that could be called “paradigmatical 
blackmail”. We all agree, says Bloom, that Shakespeare is the greatest 
author ever, that he created modernity, and that he represents the univer-
sality of literature. This problematic “we” is spread over the whole new 
preface. However, Bloom notes, the French don’t appreciate Shakespeare 
4  Although Vattimo speaks of postmodernity, he traces such “sociological 
slides” throughout the whole XXth century tradition.
5  E.g.: “We are now in an era of so-called «cultural criticism», which devalues 
all imaginative literature, and which particularly demotes and debases Shakespeare. 
Politicizing literary study has destroyed literary study, and may yet destroy learning 
itself ” (Bloom 1997, xvi). Another – yet idiosyncratic – example of the lament is 
Stanley Fish in his Professional Correctness (1995).
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sufficiently; no wonder, Bloom thus jumps to the conclusion, that it is they 
who created all those horrible schools of resentment. Then Bloom shows 
that he is not against multi-culti, only that there are “real” and “misap-
prehended” multiculturalists: 
The French have never valued originality, and until a belated Romanticism 
came to France, they never much cared for Shakespeare’s plays. They still esteem 
Shakespeare rather less than do the Indonesians or the Japanese or the Americans. 
Real multiculturalists, all over the globe, accept Shakespeare as the one indispen-
sable author, different from all others in degree, and by so much that he becomes 
different in kind. Shakespeare, as I have argued at length elsewhere, quite simply 
not only is the Western canon; he is also the world canon (Bloom 1997, xvi).
Bloom uses another kind of “paradigmatic blackmail”. He states (without 
proving; but how could you prove, except by writing an Encyclopedia 
of world culture as influenced by Shakespeare?) that modernity 
is Shakespeare’s language – made, Shakespearized. Therefore one cannot 
historicize or sociologize or materialize (etc.) Shakespeare; moreover, 
in doing so, one must use Shakespeare’s dictionary. Trying to polemicize 
with this malevolent argument is like trying to convince a religious 
fanatic that god does not exist. 
But if we go back to the original Anxiety of Influence, there are still 
many dubious moments of proclaiming both autonomous criticism 
and universalism, and I shall pinpoint them now. There is a similar 
universalizing trick that should be questioned if we don’t want to fall into 
playing Bloom’s game on his own playground. Is the whole of Bloom’s 
book normative towards poets or critics? Critics, obviously, is the answer. 
It tells them how to read, not the poets how to write. But of course, 
by this operation, Bloom’s critical ephebes will look at the poets through 
his definition of a “strong poet”, who necessarily feels anxiety towards, 
again necessarily, his “father”. If he doesn’t, if he is not a strong poet, 
then we should keep silent about him. In fact, then, Bloom’s theory 
is normative towards the poets: “write as I want to read you”. But this 
also shows the kind of social influence that Bloom ostensibly ignores: 
the writer’s anxiety about a social institution which is represented not 
only by one strong critic, but by the whole institution and/or paradigma. 
Of course the answer could be that this writer is not strong enough 
if he fears someone from outside the house, as the only justified fear 
is of the homely father. Should we take a psychoanalytic step and suggest 
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that one of the reasons for Bloom’s neglect or contempt for social influ-
ence is the very obscurity of his commitment to it? This is a common 
argument in debates between the contextualists and purists, by the way, 
and in my opinion reinforces the thesis that autonomy is found in repression. 
I move on to another dubious moment in Bloom. By the end of the book 
he suddenly states that the canonical poetry he studies must be Protestant: 
“Poetry whose hidden subject is the anxiety of influence is naturally 
of a Protestant temper, for the Protestant God always seems to isolate 
His children in the terrible double bind of two great injuctions: «Be 
like Me» and «Do not presume to be too like me»” (Bloom 1997, 
152). But the characteristics Bloom gives allows the question, why 
the Protestant temperament, not the Jewish,6 if the image of God 
is so much Abraham’s God, albeit filtrated through Kierkegaard? 
We are back to the question of Bloom’s own misreading of himself 
through “strong poets”. Bloom must say “Protestant” – if he wants to say 
anything on religion – because the poets he describes were Protestant 
(or at least raised in a Protestant culture). To say that it is ratherm a Jewish 
religious archetype would imply that the whole book is Bloom’s projec-
tion of his own problem with strong male figures. And this means, 
in consequence, that it is the institution and the subject that influences 
the writers, directly or indirectly, as is the case here. And above all, 
most obviously, to suggest that to be canonical one must be Protestant 
makes a mockery of the claim to universality. I’m approaching perhaps 
my most important argument. Although Bloom evokes the Freudian gestalt 
of a family romance, he rather escapes the consequences of the romance. 
In the Freudian version the basic archetype is the Oedipal triangle 
consisting of father, mother and child. Obviously Bloom’s romance 
is restricted to only two males, as this is an exclusively male-oriented 
theory. Incidentally Bloom evokes the “Muse” as the woman who 
is the object of trade between two men, but first of all, he never traces 
her, and secondly, although most of us literary scholars are fancy-oriented 
and appreciate imagination, to speak of a Muse in a rather serious literary 
theory is a kind of joke, more or less like the printing gremlin. Although 
Bloom wants to keep the Freudian version of the romance, comprising 
father and son, in a queer manner he calls the older one the precursor 
and the younger one the “ephebe” (Bloom 1997, 10). Although Bloom, 
then, wants to stay within the Freudian frame of rivalry, he implies rather 
6  Only a few years later, in Poetry and Repression, Bloom, referring to Vico’s 
ideas, speaks of “the true God that founded the Jewish religion”, or “Hebrew-Christian 
theology” (Bloom 1976, 7,5). Later in the text Bloom uses Lurian Kaballah which 
also lies latent beneath The Anxiety of Influence. 
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the image of paedicatio, i.e., the influence as a kind of insemination, 
and a struggle of the younger eromenos, the passive lover, to become 
the active lover, erastes. The critic’s inconsequence is clear when he speaks 
of the misreading as falling in love with a literary work (Bloom 1997, 
xxiii), while in the entire theory it is not only the object, but also 
the subject in question, so it is also falling in love with the author through 
his work, and in a different moment, when Bloom discusses the Freudian 
theory of sublimation, he denies the importance of the sexual impulse 
in favour of the aggressive one.7 So, after all, are we in the (so called) 
positive or negative Oedipus complex? Does the ephebe desire the absent 
mother and fight for her with the father, or, rather, does he fall in love 
with the father (or just with some “random” male?) in a Greek pedago- 
gical way, and in that case is (or isn’t!) his rival the absent mother? 
And where is this mother? Is she at home? Or is she, rather, in the outside, 
unhomely, realm, of which there lies a ban on representation? Or maybe 
the third side of the triangle, if it is indeed a triangle, is another man, 
the strong critic?8 I move to the last dubious moment in my account. 
7  Compare: “Whether sublimation of sexual instincts plays a central part in the 
genesis of poetry is hardly relevant to the reading of poetry, and has no part in the 
dialectic of misprision. But sublimation of aggressive instincts is central to writing 
and reading poetry, and this is almost identical with the total process of poetic 
misprision” (Bloom 1997, 115).
8  I am not the first one to “queer” Bloom’s theory. There are two approaches 
to reading Bloom – the one I share sees Bloom’s theory as already “homosexual”, 
only “ashamed” of it; the second sees Bloom’s romance as straight, but needing 
completion by a different mode of relationships between two men, inspired 
by Greek pedagogy or different homosexual kinds of relationships. I think the diffe- 
rence comes from understanding the Oedipal triangle – if we assume it might only 
have a heterosexual outcome, then Bloom is describing the straight romance; if we 
accept the theory of two different results of the complex, we might find in Bloom 
the “homosexual outcome”. Another point of difference is whether Oedipus must 
include three actors (and there are three in Bloom indeed). But even if I claim that 
in Bloom we have the “queer outcome” of Oedipus, it doesn’t mean I don’t see 
the place for a call for a different kind (less paranoid e.g.?) of relationality between 
men (which might, why not, be gay). Jan  Potkański shares this second view and quotes 
works that interpret Bloom this way – Stephen Guy-Bray’s, Stephen da Silva’s, 
Mark Bauer’s and Piotr K. Gwiazda’s. I was not aware of this tradition of reading 
while writing my argument, which, I think, proves the point that it is such an explicit 
context (Potkański 2008a, 262–278). The text includes the section “Queering 
Bloom” and an interesting interpretation of  “homoinfluence” in Jerzy Andrzejewski’s 
selected novels. My interest in queering Bloom is, however, different from that 
of Potkański and the tradition he quotes, for in each case the authors studied 
(as did Bloom) individual influences, while I am thinking of social influence 
in general, but, for the purpose of my reading, current gay literature in particular. 
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While discussing askesis, Bloom uses the Freudian theory of sublima-
tion and Lou Andreas-Salomé’s remark that “elaborating ourselves, 
we become both Prometheus and Narcisssus; or rather”, Bloom comments, 
“only the truly strong poet can go on being both, making his culture, 
and raptly contemplating his own central place in it” (Bloom 1997, 119). 
The narcissistic moment is understood according to tradition, e.g. we might 
cite André Gide’s Le traité du Narcisse from 1891 where the myth 
of Narcissus is the proclamation of the autonomy of art for art’s sake, 
or, moving a little towards social psychoanalysis, Karen Horney’s account 
of contemporary individualism as narcissistic; or, from a sociological 
perspective, we could recall Bourdieu’s concept of “hermeneutic narcis-
sism”,9 which characterizes Bloom perfectly. However, he understands 
the sacrifice of Prometheus as the sacrifice of writing poetry – in an intra- 
poetic meaning, that is, first, as a sacrifice before the precedent poem which 
evades, and also, secondly, before the possibilities of the very poem being 
written, that is, the possibilities that are rejected (Bloom 1997, 120).10 
Obviously this sacrifice does not mean anything like the not quite 
sublime poet’s hypothetical admission that he sacrifices time which 
he could spend on earning money but instead chooses to produce something 
beautifully gratuit. Bloom’s Prometheus is completely univocal, then, 
9  Compare: “In the manner of Bachelard, who spoke of “cosmic narcissism” 
with respect to an aesthetic experience of nature founded on the relationship 
“I am beatutiful because nature is beautiful and nature is beautiful because I am 
beautiful”, one could call hermeneutic narcissism, that form of encounter with 
works and authors in which the hermeneutic scholar affirms his intelligence and 
grandeur by his empathic insight into great authors” (Bourdieu 1995, 303).
10  However, in the article Prometheus Rising: The Backgrounds of Romantic 
Poetry (Bloom 1988, 3–16), Bloom studies romantic poetry, Blake and Wordsworth 
especially, in the light of European revolutions and the Puritan movement, 
although he confesses: “No intelligent, thoroughgoing Marxist critic has yet studied 
all of English Romantic literature in any detail, and I shudder to contemplate a reading 
of Blake’s epics or Byron’s “Don Juan” in the light of economic determinism alon 
[alone?]. Still, such a study would reveal much that now is only a matter for speculation 
(...)”. (p. 3). In this text Bloom also elaborates on his distinction between Catholic 
poets (conservative) and Protestant (reactionary ones). Yet in another famous Bloom’s 
text we read that the Prometheus figure for Romantics was Milton’s Satan who 
“stands finally, quite alone, upon a tower that is only himself, and his stance is all 
the fire there is. This realization leads neither to nihilism nor to solipsism (...)”. 
(Bloom 1988, 24). In the same text Bloom (p. 27) suggests that Prometheus 
was at first interested in social issues and involved in satire, but then internalized 
his quest romance and directed his view on himself. But shouldn’t we rather say, 
then, that by that turning his gaze on himself he ceased to be Prometheus and became 
Narcissus?
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with Narcissus and sacrifices nothing for any community. There 
is the half-consumed liver, but where is the fire? 
I shall swerve from Bloom’s ergocentric theory, but keep the double 
challenge for the writer to become at once Narcissus and Prometheus. 
It describes well, in my opinion, the anxieties experienced by contem-
porary writers after the paradigmatic shift into a more social-oriented 
culture. After that change the anxieties have also changed. Or, rather, 
to the narcissistic anxiety of intra-poetic influence there is added the new 
anxiety of social influence, the Promethean challenge, and the contem-
porary writer is in a double bind. This double agency dovetails with 
the Freudian description of the formation of a sadomasochistic super-ego, 
which at once is masochistic (narcissistic) and punitive (Freud 1963); 
using our image of Prometheus, as Narcissus converts his repeated pain 
of having his liver eaten into a spectacle of masochistic pleasure 
in “getting what he deserves” (Savran 1998, 23–24). Perhaps this is a transitory 
moment (but for that reason the more interesting) on the way 
to a complete change of understanding art and its producers and consu-
mers, which might be the way leading to total erasure of Narcissus in favor 
of the wing of Prometheus: or a Ganymede, who knows? At present 
there still remain residual expectations of the writers, products of the 
stage of high autonomy of the field, that they should be individuals who 
bring innovative and illuminated insights to the matter they elaborate 
on in their work, who are independent of fashions and short-lasting 
tendencies, because they are farsighted. They see more; like prophets, 
they have the courage or strong will not to be influenced by the quoti-
dian, the cliché, and also by other artists, etc. Certainly I am discussing 
here social (and/or institutional) expectations, not intra-poetic ones, 
although in their content they might be perceived as a-social, intra-
-poetic. But there are new expectations also. The writer should became 
“engaged”, “committed”, should be aware of the community for whom 
he or she writes and negotiate the message with them in an interaction. 
These two expectations, apparently contradictory, result in a demand 
for an artistically self-conscious writer with his or her own stylistic 
stamp and signature, and a social prophet who participates, understands 
the social problems of a community, and is able to foresee or at least 
to give a queer (in the sense of non-obvious) point of view, which 
means also a somehow independent one. In short, if his one leg is held 
by the community, the second is expected to take a step in a direction 
that only special individuals are able to choose. This is not an indecisive 
or inconclusive situation. But it requires a new figure between Narcissus 
and Prometheus, namely, Hermes the negotiator, the god of practical 
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intelligence who can swerve back and forth, prevaricate, and, while 
stealing fire for the people, convince the gods that they have always 
wanted to get rid of it. But this new role produces new anxieties 
that are worth examining. The question is, however, can Bloom’s 
theory be of any help, can it be modified? Can it be, in a process 
of an antithetical tessera, supplied or complemented with a more up-to-date 
dictionary, and if so how? I shall look for such solutions in the social 
psychology which elaborated the theory of social influence.
Bloom’s insistence on ergocentric reading might be interpreted 
as the result of the fundamental attribution error. To some extent the same 
could be said of other ergocentric theories. This attribution error consists 
in accentuating the character or personality in interpreting somebody’s 
behaviour and neglecting situational factors (Gilbert, Malone 1995, 
21–38). The whole sociological slide as a paradigmatic change might 
be perceived as a general change in attribution from persons or objects 
(e.g. texts) to social (situational) or political conditions (Sobolczyk 2013a, 
81–111).11
(Of course, in order to avoid falling into the same error, it should 
be noted that the very appearance of this theory with its fundamental 
attribution error might also be the product of some situation, of some 
shift in psychology and science in general; that is, the situation might 
have enabled change and instantly “produced” – made participants 
produce – tools to grasp it.) Performativity theories, e.g. that say 
we have no stable identities or personalities (how can you attribute the cause 
of something that only “happens” temporarily?), either confirm the funda- 
mental error, are the products of the theory, or both. Fredrick Jameson 
in his The Political Unconscious speaks of something worse than an error, 
although he does not refer to social psychology:
From this perspective [his neo-Marxist perspective, not social psychology’s – P.S] 
the convenient working distinction between cultural texts that are social and political 
and those that are not becomes something worse than an error: namely, a symptom 
and a reinforcement of the reification and privatization of contemporary life. Such 
a distinction reconfirms that structural, experiential, and conceptual gap between 
the public and the private, between the social and the psychological, or the political 
and the poetic, between history or society and the “individual”, which – the tendential law 
of social life under capitalism – maims our existence as individual subjects and paralyzes 
our thinking about time and change just as surely as it alienates us from our speech itself. 
11  First printed as a separate article in 2009.
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[...] The only effective liberation from such constraint begins with the recognition that 
there is nothing that is not social and historical – indeed, that everything is “in the last 
analysis” political (Jameson 1988, 20).
Jameson’s “political unconscious” is in Freudianized language what 
the effect of the attribution error is in social-psychological language. 
The emergence of social psychology is also the result of – and an attempt 
to overcome – the blurring of the gap between the social and the psycho-
logical. This is also the reason why I prefer to use it and not “just” sociology, 
because social psychology describes social interaction between two 
and more persons (which is what Bloom likewise does, but in a different 
way), and also the person in a group or confronted with a group (groups); 
and this is how I see the situation of the contemporary writer. But there 
is another aspect, related to the fundamental attribution error, in which 
Bloom’s theory of being “strong” might serve in its original shape. It has 
been observed that the attribution changes depending on whether one 
is a participant (actor) or the observer, and it depends also on the result 
of an action. Namely, the participant of an unsuccessful enterprise has 
a tendency to explain his failure in terms of situation, while the observer 
of this situation tends to find the error in the participant. Bloom 
(as an observer) does the latter when he explains artistic failures as a result 
of not being strong enough. But the unexpected positive outcome of his 
theory for, precisely, writers, might be that they overcome this tendency 
towards attribution error, and are heroic (strong!) enough to acknowledge 
their failure without blaming anything but themselves. This is what 
happens in Bloom’s “regressive” phases, kenosis and askesis, but, as Bloom 
suggests, it is never the final result, but is rather a call to withdrawfor 
a moment for reparation and stand again to fight. We are not introducing 
social explications here, contrary to what some people believe, because 
it helps reattribute the cause of an artistic failure to difficulties with literary 
institutions or to conflicts with reading communities. Narcissus might 
be a little ugly, but also, people might be too greedy towards Prometheus; 
each case needs an idiographic (which is not the same as ergocentric!) 
interpretation, and this indication is directed this time to the critics.
Social psychologists (such as Solomon Asch or Morton Deutsch 
and Harold Gerard) distinguished two types of social influence, normative and 
informative (Deutsch, Gerard 1995, 629-636). The normative influence 
occurs when a person agrees or harmonizes with the group or the dominant 
explanation for ego-safety reasons, i.e. to avoid experiencing the pains 
of becoming an outcast, or because it is pleasurable to fit in or to be liked. 
In short, this is a narcissistic motivation. The informative influence 
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occurs when a person feels that he has not got enough information, 
while at the same time there are people in the group with authority 
(of knowledge), or who argue reasonably, so that the person becomes 
influenced. It would be a mistake to exclude the narcissistic motivation 
in the case of artists, yet one has to bear in mind that most probably 
in many cases the traces of such normative influence are sublimated, 
i.e., can be read only symbolically, not allegorically. I shall venture right 
now into Bloom’s six phases, armed with some social psychology tools 
and the analysis of the contemporary literary field, in order to resigni-
ficate the figures of influence. 
Clinamen. If we understand it as the anxiety of being invaded 
by a dictionary which is “extimate”12 (Lacan’s word for something 
at once “intimate”, a part of the person, and unaccepted), that is, the stage 
of experiencing one’s own inner poetry only in others’ poems, on the social 
linguistic ground this is the anxiety of being spoken, of repeating current 
banal clichés on social issues as well as on the writer’s role. This is a stage 
“after Babel” – or “after Bakhtin”, or “after Rorty”. Rorty, resignificating 
Bloom, drew the conclusion that a person who manages to introduce 
a change in the vocabulary, this change being understood as a metaphor 
– and this is Bloom’s “strong poet” – is the one most able to experience 
his/her own contingency (Rorty 1993, 28). But in Bloom what is at stake, 
obviously, is not “contingency”, but “universality”. The anxiety might 
be felt towards some hypostasis of a “global contemporary language” 
as well as towards some particular “ultimate language” of a person 
(e.g. authority figure), group (e.g. LGBTQ community), the dominant 
(media) discourse or the economic conditions of publishing. “Language” 
or “dictionary” obviously means not only the vocabulary and idioms 
or catch-phrases, but also dominant tropes, allegories, examples 
and narrative coherences (I do not distinguish between so-called 
“content” and “form”). We might imagine a writer who “has his novel 
inside him” on queer sexualities, but who gets no result beyond a banal 
parable about how some people are victimized, which in the end is not 
much different from a tabloid cover story. While some normative-influen-
tial impulse might be satisfied (a group or an authority is satisfied because 
the product fulfills their expectations), the narcissistic part of the super-ego 
might not be pleased with the stylistic effect as insufficiently “artistic”. 
12  Compare in Bloom: “When a potential poet first discovers poetry as being 
both external and internal to himself, he begins a process that will end only when he has 
no more poetry within him, long after he has the power (or desire) to discover it 
outside himself again” (Bloom 1997, 25). 
praktyka 1(11)/2014teoretyczna37
The Anxiety of Social Influence
Or the other way round. While the writer might have the feeling that he 
or she was influenced informatively, i.e. wrote about important things 
somebody experienced (e.g. a case of gay-bashing) or some groups keep 
reporting, the person might at the same time feel the lack of acceptance 
in terms of normativity from the literary field that values the so-called 
artistic side. Bourdieu showed also that popular writers in the early 
stage of the formation of the literary field aspired to some kind of social 
critique.13 We must certainly not neglect the anxiety described by Bloom 
as well, namely, that of a preceding artistic work that the newcomer falls 
in love with. After all, what he or she is trying to succeed at is literature, 
not journalism, so they try to imitate the idealized text which occupies 
a position in the literary field. Clinamen is also a decisive point 
for the subject, whichever choice he or she makes between the two 
states described by social psychologist Stanley Milgram: the agentic state 
or the autonomous state (which should not be mistaken for literary auto-
nomy, the esthetical form). In the first state the individual sees him- or herself 
as a representative of other people, e.g. of a specified group, as a synec-
doche, and acts on behalf of them, or according to some phantasmatic 
demand ascribed to that group. (The psychology of social groups indi-
cates many symptomatic errors of judgement that might arise in such 
a case, such as unquestioning faith in group morals, rationalization 
of counterarguments, stereotyping of the enemy, stress on conformity, 
autocensorship, the illusion of unanimity, etc.) (Turner, Pratkanis 1994, 
254–270). For instance, an aspiring gay writer might feel under pressure 
to give a good representation of a gay person as demanded by either 
the dominant social group (dominantly heterosexual), or the integra-
tionist gay movement. The corrective movement of a new poem which 
Bloom describes, on social influence grounds, is the movement from 
the agentic state to the autonomous state, which means that the writer 
acknowledges his or her right to disagree in some respects on social 
13  Compare: “But there is no better proof of the effectiveness of the calls to order 
inscribed in the very logic of the field as it moves toward autonomy than the recognition 
that the authors who appear to be the most directly subordinate to external demands 
or exigencies, not only in their social behaviour but in their work itself, are more and more 
often forced to grant to the specific norms of the field; as if, in order to honour their 
status as writers, they must manifest a certain distance from the dominant values. 
Thus, if one only knows them through the sarcasms of Baudelaire and Flaubert, 
it comes as something of a surprise when one discovers that the most typical 
representatives of the bourgeois theatre offer, far from unequivocal praise of bour- 
geois life and values, a violent satire on the very foundations of that existence 
and of the «lowering of manners” imputed to certain personages of the court and 
the imperial bourgeoisie» (Bourdieu 1995, 69–70).
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and esthetical issues, even if he or she agrees in many other respects with 
the influential “vocabulary”.  
Tessera. Once given the right to disagree, the writer tries to justify 
the social value of his or her antithetical position to create the sentiment 
of ingratitude of which Bloom speaks (Bloom 1997, 62). There is an effort 
to conceal antithesis as supplement, completion. In the theory of cognitive 
dissonance there arises the attempted justification effect. It occurs when 
the subject’s big effort to achieve something is not subjectively rewarded 
enough, not recognized externally; the subject then attributes greater 
value to the effect. In our case, the writer’s effort to take an “inde-
pendent”, but in fact metonymically close, position, and his or her 
efforts to create a justification for it, are socially neglected. The effort 
is not perceived as distinctive enough. Although performed in good 
faith that it is society or a group that has not gone far enough – is, 
to use Bloom’s word, “truncated” (Bloom 1997, 66) – so that the writer 
has complemented it, the agent of influence likewise sees the literary 
outcome of this process as “truncated”: neither a rupture nor a confir-
mation. Tessera might adopt the form of completing the social discourse 
with “better language”, or a more elaborate one. The writer, in this case, 
remains a kind of esthetical adornment, a nice supplement, while 
the antithetical position still confirms the division between the social 
and political and the artistic, instead of problematizing it and blurring 
the boundaries. Tessera might also make the subject realize that there 
is a difference between the normative and the informative influence and, 
in consequence, adopt an antithetical position to one of them, depen-
ding on which one the person attributes to him- or herself. That is, 
if the subject considers the influence that is being overcome as normative, 
he or she might take the position of still being socially influenced, yet now 
more by expert theory rather than folk theory, or simply by conformist 
pressure. This is an optimistic variant, but certainly the opposite is also 
possible. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s ironical catchphrase about the 1990s 
fashion in literary scholarship, inspired by queer theory, for describing texts 
as “kinda subversive, kinda hegemonic”14 might be paraphrased for tessera, 
which is neither subversive nor hegemonic. And yet there is a possible positive 
way of moving from this position. A supplement cannot by definition 
be hegemonic. But it can (and how!) be subversive. As Hermes. Therefore, 
in the end, going through this phase makes the anxious writer realize how 
the influence might be reworked into becoming, possibly, influential. 
14  I quote after Edwards (2009, 107). 
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Kenosis. If we understand this position as a temporary and apparent 
submission to the influential force and the will to modestly mime 
it (Bielik-Robson 2002, 219), which in the end becomes distorted 
or displaced, then we might say that on the writer’s road to subversiveness 
this phase represents a kind of parody which recognizes the political 
potential of parody, but does not achieve this political outcome. I refer 
to Judith Butler’s distinction between effective parodies and failed ones. 
Not every parody is subversive. But in kenosis the writer is closer than 
in tessera to the state of being “kinda subversive, kinda hegemonic”. Kinda 
narcissistic, kinda Promethean. Kinda influenced, kinda influential. Kinda 
artistic, kinda socially committed. But precisely this “kinda” is the effect 
of blurring the distinction between literary and political, between social 
and psychological, between private and public. In terms of attribu-
tion theory this phase represents the cognitive crossroads – that kind 
of cognitive dissonance where everything seems to be a double entendre, 
but the subject, out of apparent weakness, celebrates for a moment 
this state and learns perspectivism. According to Harold Kelley’s model 
of attribution factors, there are three questions that identify mental processes 
before the attribution is performed effectively: does the subject always 
behave this way in this situation? Does the subject behave differently 
in different situations? Do the others behave likewise in this situation? 
(Kelley 1973, 107–128). For the attribution to be successful, questions 
must be answered either “yes” or “no”. But with the “kinda” of kenosis, 
the modality changes into “rather yes”, “probably”, “sometimes”, “to some 
extent”. As a result, there is no attribution error. The parodist subject 
is neither fully actor nor fully observant – although he or she observes 
and acts (mimes). The outcome, both in Bloom and Butler, weakens 
the source of influence: Bloom says that the precursor becomes less divine 
and more human; Butler says that the imitation shows that the apparent 
original was always a copy and that there are no originals. Some queer 
critics and critics of queer theory, such as Leo Bersani15 or Moya Lloyd,16 
discuss examples of dubious parodies, such as gay male skinhead, lipstick 
lesbian, Barbie slasher, gay S-Mist in a Nazi costume etc. While some 
argue that it is exclusively the agency, i.e. intention, that makes a gay 
male skinhead a subversive parody of hypermasculinity, the others point 
to the social misfire such a figure might produce in a context that lacks 
15  Leo Bersani discusses “gay Marines”, “gay soldiers”, and “gay machos 
in the gym” in a different way from Butler in the latter’s subversive parodies (Bersani 
1995, 17–19).
16  M. Lloyd, Performativity, Parody, Politics. I quote after Sullivan (2006, 87–89). 
Not every parody 
is subversive. 
But in kenosis the writer 
is closer, as opposed 
to tessera, to the state 
of being “kinda subver-
sive, kinda hegemonic”. 
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Promethean. Kinda influ-
enced, kinda influential. 
Kinda artistic, kinda 
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sufficient information. After all, even a queer theoretician, making his or 
her most revolutionary and subversive claim at a conference, might be 
taken to be a straight homophobe. In the case of the gay male skinhead 
as analyzed by Lloyd, without taking into account the social associations 
of Nazis with racism and homophobia, the successful subversion might 
happen only in very specific conditions, and precisely those conditions 
that do not fully depend on the agent’s intention. So Butler finally said 
of subversiveness that it is unpredictable, “the kind of effect that resists 
calculation”.17 This is the very place where, I think, attribution theory 
might play a crucial role in the effort to calculate the outcome by shifting 
the perspective from the actor to the observer and asking attribution 
questions. Moya Lloyd polemicizes with Butler in this respect, when 
she “claims that it is possible to gauge the likely outcomes of particular 
actions if one examines the ways in which similar activities performed 
in similar contexts have functioned in the past. She stresses that this will 
not necessarily guarantee success, but will make political action viable, 
if somewhat unpredictable” (Sullivan 2006, 92). But is it subversion 
or rather the kenotic “kinda subversion” (kinda assimilation)? I fully agree 
with Butler when she says “I am not interested in delivering judgments 
on what distinguishes the subversive from the unsubversive” (Butler 
2006, xxii) and “the effort to name the criterion for subversiveness 
will always fail, and ought to” (Butler 2006, xxiii).18 This is not a call 
to stop using this word, but is perhaps a call to give up, at least partially, 
using it as an ethical/aesthetical (and both at the same time) judgement 
for normative reasons. It might be, I believe, still used for descriptive 
reasons and on this ground as a possible, albeit contingent, indication 
(not prescription – I follow Butler in this respect). Subversiveness 
is a very manipulable concept and ought to be. Like other dialectical 
concepts, it might be applied both as an averse and reverse of the 
same performances – by manipulating their temporality. For example, 
one might challenge the judgement that a given performance is subversive, 
because it transcends the social and/or aesthetical situation at this time; 
but through the manipulative use of metalepsis it might also be said that, 
for this very reason, the same performance is not subversive, because 
17  This phrase appears in the text Critically Queer, but only in its first printing 
in Butler (1993, 29), not in its reprint in Bodies That Matter (1993).
18  And also: “subversive performances always run the risk of becoming dead- 
ening clichés through their repetition and, most importantly, through their repeti- 
tion within commodity culture where “subversion” carries market value” (Butler 2006, 
xxii-xxiii), the same being true of literary, artistic and academic cultures, where 
“subversive” becomes equated with “innovative” and, generally, “positive” (“desired”).
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it does not transcend the situation that, on the first view, it has just created! 
Since all is in permanent movement and in the process of (un)becoming, 
there is no state of ever-successful subversiveness, and this is why it might 
always be manipulated. The task of the critic, or reader, but also 
of the writer, then, is to describe as precisely as possible the condi-
tions in which the performance is being produced. In the attribution 
theory we find the difference between Kelley’s theory that to make 
a successful attribution one needs to repeat the same observation over time 
– and the Heider & Simmel theory that in many contexts the subject 
deals with a new, scheme-breaking situation and thus needs to perform 
the attribution without recalling the preceding situations (Heider, 
Simmel 1944, 243–259). This leads, further, to the Hilton and Slugoski 
model of “abnormal” attributions as breaking the “attributive schemes” 
(Hilton, Slugoski 1986, 75–88). In this theory, “automatic” attributions 
are not “real” attributions, just mechanical behaviour, but a strange, 
decontextualizing situation is a call for attribution. This is exactly the job 
of planned or intended subversions: they are planned on the basis 
of the recognition of what is schematic in the social thinking 
and an attempt to defamiliarize the context. The reader and the critic 
should precisely distinguish both moments of “planning”, the first, which 
includes the intentionality factor (that is, reading the actor’s perspective 
from the actor’s perspective, if one is the performer of the utterance, 
or from the observer’s perspective if one is in the position of a “critic”, 
“reader” or “audience”) and the descriptive moment of the situation, 
including the characteristics of available “attributive schemes” (which itself 
is the attributive reading of the situation – or objects); and then, 
the second moment, which describes how the “abnormal” (or, in Kuhn’s 
language, “anomaly”) cracked with the schemes and how the effect was 
attributed, and to what or whom, and whether it has been cited (iterated), 
thus becoming the new scheme, resp. a new social convention out 
of an individual attempt, which is the third moment to distinguish. 
In kenosis we are in the first moment, and the travel through time follows 
Bloomian phases, offering in each one a different metaleptic manipulation. 
Daemonization. This phase is, as follows, the radicalization of the “kinda” 
modality, and the increasing self-awareness of the writer as independent 
of normative influence above all on both levels, the artistic (“I create 
my style and I might be the influence for others, not the other way 
round”), and the social (“my opinion on social issues is able to ascend 
above the dominant and show the future direction”). But still those two 
levels are not fully integrated (where integration means interlacing). 
praktyka 1(11)/2014teoretyczna 42
Piotr Sobolczyk
The daemonization effect is more complex, regarding the informative 
influence, than the normative one. In Bloom the demonic effect means 
making the precursor more “human” and the ephebe more “demonic”. 
In terms of (social) informative influence I could show this difference 
as a shift from the image of the writer as a kind of journalist who is nosing 
around his theme within the society, to a vision of a writer to whom 
the society voluntarily delivers themes on the assumption that he or she can 
make them clearer and more comprehensible. Instead of being on the street 
for investigation, the demon is on a throne as a judge. (Bloom stressed 
the at times grotesque realizations of this phase). The informative influence 
is not a source of anxiety, then, if the writer has the illusion (creates 
the illusion) that he or she graciously accepts it or rejects it, that is, 
the illusion of control (every lord has informers and councillors 
in the court). In terms of the phases of subversiveness, this is the second 
moment and the first metalepsis: what in the beginning was the writer’s 
intention on the basis of the recognition of “attributive schemes” and only 
a plan, now, after recognizing its positive (i.e. subversive) effects, 
is re-told as having been calculated. Social psychology calls it the “I knew 
it from the start” effect. Just to make more things clear: social psychology 
studied the devilish halo effect or the Lucifer effect, as Zimbardo calls 
it, which in this case is rather confusing than clarifying, since what 
Bloom means is either the Miltonian Lucifer or the gnostic Lucifer, 
and both these Lucifers, as well as Byron’s Cain and a gallery of worshipped 
literary characters, represent the positive effect of subversion; and social 
psychologists adopt those terms in their popular (Christian) meaning, 
wherein the Luciferian side of a man means that he is able to do bad 
things in certain social circumstances. This discrepancy at the same 
time shows the difference between dictionaries in the literary field 
and the common folk discourse, but also, in this case, the attribution 
fallacy itself (Zimbardo and other social psychologists attribute the signifi- 
cation of Lucifer to the folk code, Bloom and most writers and critics 
to the historical convention of literary rebels). 
Askesis. In Bloom the ephebe in this phase manipulates the precursor 
so that the initial ephebe’s falling in love with him now becomes 
the precursor’s desire for ephebe which was there already from the beginning, 
as the desire of the precursor to have a disciple.19 In social terms this 
manipulation means that the writer who at the beginning felt a part 
19  There are different interpretations of askesis. I follow Potkański (2008b, 
267–268). 
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and was seen as a part of social discourse, just a voice in it, now mani-
pulates this discourse so that it appears that from the beginning, from 
the clinamen, the writer was an original voice who actively shaped 
the discourse and that his or her original social views expressed in arti-
stic form influenced this very discourse. The writer also manipulates 
the situation to say that the situation (social situation, i.e. the discourse) 
needed him from the beginning, because it was too stagnant. Therefore 
it might also take the shape of the argument that the writer had to 
become what he or she became (the individual stylist with original social 
views) because there existed the demand for it on the part of society, 
or that the society “pushed” him or her to occupy this specific, both outcast 
and integrated, position. (This is the last phase and the second metalepsis, 
if you follow my somewhat complicated distinctions.) In social psycho-
logy terms, this effect could be seen as a conscious manipulation with 
actor and observer perspectives as in the fundamental attribution error: 
if in clinamen, as I have described it above, the writer is rather the obse-
rver, or a “medium”, a “passive” interpreter – or, rather, interpretant – 
then in askesis he manipulates this condition, claiming that he was 
an “actor” from the beginning, except that, as all good spy novels instruct you, 
at the beginning he had to work undercover: because  sub-version starts 
as sub-terranean or under water and works by tricking (manipulating) 
the dominant view through irony and metalepsis, pretty much as in Bloom. 
This manipulation is very comfortable for the writer, because it might 
be manipulated to explain both artistic and social risks: according 
to the fundamental error, the observer has the tendency to underscore 
the role of the agents while ignoring the “circumstances”, and the actors 
attribute it to themselves in case of success, but to the circumstances 
in case of failure. While in clinamen the writer was in the position 
of neither (neither only observer, nor full actor), in askesis he or she 
might manipulate, depending on the charge or demand, his position 
as an observer who could not adequately recognize the role of circumstances 
(i.e., paid too much attention to the “artistic” part, his language etc.), 
or the other way round, the charge or demand being the opposite, 
might manipulate his or her position as an actor who was too focused 
on the circumstances (i.e. too “socially engaged”), to spend too much 
time on elaborating the form. In askesis, then, if the writer accuses or 
revisions him- or herself, it always has the positive effect of self-defence. 
Apophrades. In this phase both levels are fully integrated in the writer 
so that he or she becomes at once the artistic master and the social 
prophet in such a way that nobody can precisely separate these aspects. 
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The social outgrowth of subversion is effective because it is artistic; 
the work is artistic because it is so socially innovative and provoking. 
It is not exactly that external final dictionaries do not influence the writer 
at all in this phase – rather he or she ironically and contingently uses them 
at his or her will, or at his or her play, if you like; the effect is the common 
(external) belief that it is precisely this writer who organizes the social 
dictionary and creates new entries to it, which acquire a social life. 
But what is most important is that this is not a definite and final stage. 
Subversiveness as it is rooted in queer theory, which in turn is modelled 
perhaps most similarly on romantic irony (Sobolczyk 2013b), is a never-ending 
process of displacements and apophatic un-becoming. And in this respect 
my account pretty much departs from Bloom, who preferred to avoid 
this kind of ironic negativity, rendering his apophrades problematic 
(Bielik-Robson 2002, 237–238). In Poetry & Repression Bloom ascribed 
his phases to rhetorical tropes, but in his vision irony is not a “master 
trope” (as I see it after e.g. Vico, Burke, de Man and White); therefore 
it is not the final trope, but is the very first trope of clinamen, while 
the final phase is assigned to metalepsis (Bloom 1976, 1–27). I see it 
as exactly the other way round.20 Or, rather, metalepsis as a simple trick 
of representing the later as though it were earlier, contains irony as one 
simple technique alongside antiphrasis for instance, but irony cannot 
be reduced to either of these tropes. Bloom’s description of what is ironical 
in clinamen – “expressing the opposite of the instinct it battles” (Bloom 
1976, 16) – is precisely the reduction of irony to antiphrasis,21 which 
means that Bloom is not speaking of irony in this case. On the contrary, 
Bloom’s description of apophrades in psychoanalytic terms, as a “balance 
between introjection (or identification) and projection (or casting-out 
20  Potkański (2008b, 389–390) also says that metalepsis either is the first stage 
trope (in clinamen), or might be seen as  any  ephebe’s move, which means that 
it works on each level; which – this is my addition – means that it is just a “simple” 
word-trick, not a Master Trope, that might serve “bigger masters” (Master Tropes). 
As Poetic Crossing [1976] (Bloom 1988, 150) attests, Bloom was aware that irony 
might be a master trope. On Master Tropes see Burke (1962, 503–517).
21  In the text quoted above, Bloom assigns irony to Freudian “reaction forma- 
tion” (as it appears in clinamen). In Poetic Crossing (Bloom 1988, 145) he claims that 
reaction-formation in rhetoric is “illusio or simple irony, irony as a figure of speech” 
(my emphasis). We might assume that Bloom for some reason abstains from different 
understandings of irony, but his use of the word is not always precise. I persist 
in maintaining that what he calls “irony” in fact “is not” irony. William R. Schutz 
says that Bloom’s irony is the same as the “parody” studied by Russian formalists 
(Schutz 1994, 150–152). Once again I should say that “parody” is less “ironic” 
(and more “antiphrastic” or “hyperbolistic”) than “pastiche”.
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the forbidden)” (Bloom 1976, 20)22 – which suits exactly my description 
of what is going on between the actor and observer perspectives as well 
as between the Narcissus and Prometheus sides in the subject – I see 
as ironic and this balance is never full or everlasting. Bloom’s vision 
is problematic if one imagines a circle that has a closure. But romantic 
irony, queer and the process of ongoing subversive challenges might 
rather take the form of a spiral, or, in its campier version, of a garland. 
But this garland is not to be confounded with the laurel crown donated 
by the grateful society.
In the final paragraph I want to offer a brief analysis of a few examples 
of Polish queer and gay novels as they situate themselves on the map 
of “phases”.23 This part might perhaps be less understandable for my 
potential international readers not oriented in Polish literature or its 
social contexts. The writers I take as examples all made their debuts after 
2000, and I refer to their first or second books.
Clinamen. Mikołaj Milcke’s two novels, Gay and the City (2011) 
and Or I’m gonna be a pain in the ass! (2013; all titles in my translation), 
play with the “chicklit” genre adapted as – contradictorily since it might 
(or might not) sound “girl” – “gay chicklit”. “Chicklits” were considered 
subversive among literary genres addressed to women, for they were more 
radical than the patriarchy-embedded popular “romances”, and likewise 
“the glamorous female press” and “female junk press”, and yet were not 
as artistically and socially subversive (i.e., also, hard to read) as feminist 
artistic novels. However, this subversive edge gets erased in Milcke when 
adapted for a gay audience. There was no considerable tradition of “gay 
pulp” in Poland at the time of publication, only the high artistic tradition 
of (socially and artistically) complicated prose. Milcke fails to achieve 
the latter (although he probably aspires to it), and from “chicklit” he is able 
22  Bloom says that “metalepsis or transmutation [is] the only trope-reversing 
 trope”. Obviously this is a manipulation, because the “trope-reversing trope” is irony. 
Metalepsis is “just” a “word-reversing trope”. I do not wish to become too submer- 
ged in situating Bloom’s thought in the history of literary theories, which has already 
been done, but shall just recall that, first, Bloom was trying to conceal Kenneth 
Burke (who wrote about Four Master Tropes, with irony as the “trope of tropes”) 
as his predecessor and, secondly, Bloom was in constant polemic with Paul de Man, 
who re-constructed the understanding of romantic irony as an all-encompassing 
trope. 
23  For the exemplification of my thesis on this double bind of influences upon 
contemporary writers, see also my earlier text, a discussion of an anthology of seven 
short stories “written on demand” about AIDS. In this text I do not refer to Bloom 
(although I do to Bourdieu), nor do I develop the theory of phases, but I do distin- 
guish the social influence from the “literary” (Sobolczyk 2011, 175–204). 
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to take only the general “costume”, with a significant inversion 
in the back- and foregrounds: while in the chicklits a woman (foreground) 
had a best friend who was gay (background), in Milcke it is otherwise. 
Thus his novels fall into the category of “pulp”. One might also trace on nume-
rous pages the moments when the “dictionary” speaks (via) the narrator, 
not otherwise. Whenever the narrator comments on any social aspect 
of being gay in Poland, he is reserved and offers press-clichés that 
in Polish press discourse are identified with the “liberal” press; however, 
for the LGBTQ organizations’ standards – as well as for academic queer 
theory and also “artistic” narrative – they are disappointingly conservative 
(“adaptive”). There is little pictorial sex, because “people” associate 
gay people with anal sex (and this is bad), etc. From the literary style 
of the author one might get a whiff of his degree in journalism, which 
in this case means he is not good at creating even a well-made plot, 
not to mention artistic effects.
Tessera. Compared with Milcke’s novels, Adam Mikołaj Zdeb’s poetic prose 
(novel?!) Love is, but badly made, because in pink (2011) is at the opposite 
pole. It does not seek easy understanding on behalf of the reader, 
employing “artistic” dead clichés such as incoherent style, metaphors, 
loose composition etc. which in terms of the literary avant-garde evoke 
either the prose of the 30s, or the nouveau roman-influenced prose 
from the 60s; for example, in the Polish gay literature, Gates to Paradise 
by Jerzy Andrzejewski could be mentioned. As I have just stressed, 
however, these conventions are “dead” in the literary field, not innovative. 
Zdeb creates a kind of mannerist (not in the positive meaning) “artistic” 
adornment which ineptly covers up a weak plot about a broken heart. 
At the same time, also as a kind of supplement, he tries to introduce 
an “intellectual” value to his novel, embodied in an ejaculation of the narrator, 
who, after reading Judith Butler, happens to understand that people 
are cheated by the discourse on love because love is also performative. 
Intellectually this conclusion is utterly naive, since Butler claims that 
everything is performative: there is no distinction between performance 
and anything “real”, “objective”, “reified”. Therefore the book falls 
under the heading of “based on false pretences”. It is neither subversive 
nor “hegemonic”, and satisfies nobody.
Kenosis. Marcin Szczygielski’s Pick-up sticks (2010) is potentially 
successful simultaneously as a “gay pop” novel and as a “teenage novel”. 
However this very combination, apparently based on a conformist attitude 
towards literary genres and conventions, offers a supplement on the socio- 
logy of literary forms level. On the surface it introduces gay sex 
and a queer family (as opposed to “traditional families”, which are “bad” 
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in this fable) into the “teenage novel”. But meta-artistically it does some-
thing more: it strips away the “pedagogical” conventions of reading 
and programming literary performances (as writing and reading acts); 
for in the literary education discourse there is an agreement that teenagers 
are supposed to read literary works for “adults”, i.e. the “canon”, yet the novels 
produced as an “alternative (contemporary) canon” for teenagers castrate 
themselves from (pedagogically) “undesired” content; Szczygielski calls 
for consistency in this respect. His social ambitions might fail, however, 
since the book gained popularity rather among gay adults, and by no 
means redefined the “alternative canon”; but perhaps this work is still 
in progress. There are also more “kinky”, that is, subversive moments, 
but probably for the cognoscenti’s eyes only. The main character Paweł 
is gay-bashed by his older brother, so that “read straight” this is just 
a conventional story of “gay bashing” (in the family). However, the eye 
of the cognoscenti sees that the older brother employs many techniques 
used also on erotic grounds in the sneak subculture, such as smelling 
stinking socks etc. Therefore we are faced rather with a rape whose 
sexual nature is hidden but recognizable. The reader might speculate now 
on the repression of the queer desire of the older brother which results 
in aggression and so forth. Another example of kenotic “kinda subversive, 
kinda hegemonic” might be Bartosz Żurawiecki’s debut novel Three men 
in the bed (to say nothing of the cat) (2005) and the discussion it raised. 
While some critics saw it as simply an “inversive” romance (its subtitle 
being “a passive romance”), that is, an adaptation of a “patriarchal” 
and “straight” genre only with gay characters instead of straight ones, 
the others, more queer theory-influenced, pointed out that, for example, 
it subversively opts for a “private space” for gay people which is denied 
by the political claims (such as visibility) of LGBTQ organizations. The very 
romance plot is indeed “kinda subversive” – a gay couple acquires 
a third party and constitutes a ménage à trois for a moment – and “kinda 
hegemonic”, for finally it seems that threesomes are not good for either 
of the parties involved (it is better to have couples, then).        
Daemonization. Michał Zygmunt’s novel New Romantic “collected” 
the social anxieties of queer people and also of  “leftish people” in Poland around 
2005, after the installation of the conservative Law and Justice (Prawo 
i Sprawiedliwość) government and transformed it into a political fantasy 
of Poland in (the near) future, where depressed and repressed queers take over 
the power. The anxieties are, then, daemonized even to the point of grotesquerie; 
however, the answer is neither a utopia nor a dystopia. It ironizes subversively 
the idea of “getting more power” on behalf of the LGBTQ organizations (if they 
really wish for it; or it is their “repressed” fantasy), which makes this argument 
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peculiarly close to the conservative rhetoric, but at the same time dismantles 
the conservative fantasies as well.
Askesis. Two novels by Bartosz Żurawiecki that followed Three men..., 
i.e. I, or my 66 loves (2007) and The Unrepresented (2011), might be seen 
as a manipulated auto-revision (“it was there from the start” – the thing 
you criticized me for its not being there). Both novels take up the motive 
of the defence of domestic yet still queer life, as sketched in Three men..., 
yet now package it in a refined, postmodern, abrupt form rather than 
a “soft” romance genre, making the social claim more poignant, 
and, ironically, more clear-cut, while at the same time everything in these 
novels, as in good postmodern and queer fiction, is more ambiguous 
(if “ambiguity” is a mode of communication understood more directly 
by those who criticized me, I shall give it to them, but making 
it a double-edged sword). The queer message is against exclusions inside 
the LGBTQ community: being queer is not restricted to walking 
in parades or sitting in on a sexchat; queer opts for various lifestyles 
and ought to be against forcing people to live so as to feel “not at home”. 
In I, or my 66 loves this is obtained by a long description of virtual adven-
tures on a sexchat which are finally bracketed; yet the idea that a couple 
consisting of two (men) is better for some lovers is not combined with 
a genre charged with dubious (patriarchal, heteronormative) associations, 
that is “romance” as in Three men…. (Obviously the idea of combining 
a “conservative” genre with “progressive” issues might in itself be subver-
sive, but in this case the effect was more of a misfire, ending in the kenotic 
“kinda”.) Żurawiecki plays with the idea of unambiguity, finally 
manipulating the debut novel so that it seems to have been subversive 
in the beginning, only in a subtler manner which went unrecognized; 
while in the latter novels he either uses ambiguity to obtain unambiguity 
or the other way round, in the end ironizing the very situation.
Apophrades. There is no better queer example so far of a successful 
subversion which changed the dictionary than Michał Witkowski’s 
Lovetown (many different editions starting from 2004). In fact 
Witkowski’s work follows ironically (or simply metaconsciously) many 
phases of the anxiety of social influence. It starts with an ironic clinamen 
with a narrator who is an aspiring writer, but visits two old queens 
to write a press coverage for a popular weekly, and his descriptions 
of the setting and of the two heroines mock the idea of disengage- 
ment (for soon we learn that the old queens, as also the gay milieu, 
know “editor Michał” very well as “Michaśka” or “Snow White”) and false 
language. Many different editions, with Lovetown without censorship 
(2012) at the forefront, which now is the basis for international 
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translations, are a project of ironic tessera(s), in which the author adds 
material, throwing in new anecdotes about characters already present 
in the original edition, at times even having these anecdotes allegedly 
delivered by the very characters depicted in the novel (that is, their 
prototypes), who “correct” the narrator or “recall more” etc. This effect 
is not always successful, for the “final” edition in my opinion is overloaded. 
The tessera strategy is also the basic concept for another of Witkowski’s 
books, Lumberjack (2011), which eventually surpasses the condition 
of a supplement (to Lovetown), and by the same token the phase 
of tessera, moving towards the phases of daemonization (when he exalts 
and diminishes his “demonic” and famous masterpiece, Lovetown), and askesis 
(when he completes Lovetown with a displacement which opens up his 
writing to a new genre, a pastiche of a crime story). However, Witkowski 
re-employed the tessera strategy once again in Felon and the Girl (2014), 
this time providing a supplement to Lumberjack (and only incidentally 
to Lovetown), and this attempt I place at the kenosis phase, for the result 
is less interesting artistically and stylistically than Lumberjack, not to mention 
Lovetown. The autoparasitic strategy tires and disappoints, while not 
many new themes are introduced and those are less interesting than 
in previous books. In the end it arrives at a “kinda” condition. It is not 
completely weak artistically, but not great; it has some social threads 
but they lose their potential in the whole construction. Apophrades originally 
in Bloom means the return of the dead which makes the living stronger 
through revision, but still nothing seems stronger than the “dead”, 
which in this case is Lovetown, and the whole career of Witkowski seems 
to be a struggle with his own influence via escapes from it (with the novels 
Barbara Radziwiłłówna from Jaworzono-Szczakowa and Margot which 
both represent clinamen, try as they might to evade Lovetown’s tropes) 
or completions. In Lovetown perhaps the most “apophratic” moment 
is when a group of gay activists tries to program Witkowski’s “gay novel”, 
in which he constitutes himself as an independent and queer (also queer 
versus gay) writer and social thinker who, instead of being captivated 
by an “external” language of “obligations”, constitutes his own. Successfully. 
Originally a hyper-intertextual work collecting and mixing motives 
and allusions to numerous local queer tropes and codes, as well as 
to literary works (since Polish modernism abounds in queer literature), 
it changed the Polish discourse and dictionary on the subject completely. 
The dead come back, then, but Witkowski stands in line with them 
as a peer-to-peer.           
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Abstrakt: Tekst odnosi się do kategorii wprowadzonych przez Harolda 
Blooma w Lęku przed wpływem. Jego teoria zostaje uznana za immanen-
tystyczną, tj. zorientowaną na tekst/osobowość (pisarza), nie na kategorie 
społeczne. Od lat 80. w humanistyce dokonuje się „socjologizacja”, 
przez niektórych myślicieli obserwowana z trwogą (Finkielkraut), przez 
innych twórczo rozwijana. Bloomowskie kategorie zostają przechwycone 
i zresygnifikowane w kategoriach psychologii społecznej, aby umożliwić 
opis współczesnej sytuacji pisarza.
Słowa kluczowe: wpływ społeczny, psychoanaliza, psychologia społeczna, 
socjologizacja humanistyki, literatura homotekstualna
